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Abstract
The internationalization of postsocialist countries brought about by the activities of multinational 
corporations (MNCs) has produced a growing diversity of actors capable of shaping work standards 
in these countries. The organizational and institutionalist literature on MNCs has concentrated only 
on the outcomes of such internationalization processes in terms of diffusing MNCs’ organizational 
practices or adapting them to host-country conditions. This paper offers a theoretical and empirical 
scrutiny of the process through which MNCs establish and reinforce their position in host-country 
labor markets and societies. In particular, the focus is on how MNCs become legitimate actors in 
changing work standards in host-country labor markets, and how host-country actors (i.e., workers, 
trade unions, and the local society) become capable of shaping MNCs’ organizational practices in 
postsocialist subsidiaries. This process is referred to as MNC embedding. 
Building on a qualitative case study of a Dutch MNC and its subsidiaries in Hungary and Poland, the 
paper theorizes and empirically documents how embedding occurs and what conditions facilitate 
it. It is argued that particular interaction dynamics in each MNC subsidiary studied account for the 
extent to which MNC embedding occurs via unilateral managerial decisions or with the involvement 
of local actors. Moreover, social interaction between MNCs and host-country actors facilitates in-
stitution building from below. This means that through social interaction MNCs become legitimate 
actors contributing to institution building in environments where broader institutional underpin-
nings of work practices and traditions of collective bargaining are less extensive than in continental 
Western Europe.
Zusammenfassung
Die Aktivitäten multinationaler Unternehmen forcieren die wirtschaftliche Internationalisierung 
postsozialistischer Länder. Hierdurch wächst in diesen Ländern die Vielfalt an Akteuren, die in der 
Lage sind, Arbeitsstandards zu entwickeln. Die organisationssoziologische und institutionalistisch 
orientierte Literatur zum Thema hat sich vor allem mit den Auswirkungen von Internationalisie-
rungsprozessen auf die Verbreitung organisatorischer Praktiken der Unternehmen oder ihrer Anpas-
sung an die Bedingungen des Aufnahmelands beschäftigt. Dieses Papier bietet nunmehr eine theore-
tische und empirische Untersuchung der Prozesse, durch die multinationale Konzerne ihre Position 
im Arbeitsmarkt und in der Gesellschaft des Aufnahmelandes finden und festigen. Das Hauptinter-
esse liegt auf der Frage, wie multinationale Unternehmen zu legitimen Akteuren werden, die Arbeits-
standards in postsozialistischen Beschäftigungsmärkten verändern können und wie die Akteure des 
Aufnahmelandes (Arbeiter, Gewerkschaften und die lokale Bevölkerung) in die Lage versetzt werden, 
die Praktiken dieser Unternehmen mitzugestalten. Dies wird als Prozess der Einbettung multinatio-
naler Unternehmen gedeutet. 
Anhand einer qualitativen Fallstudie zu einem niederländischen Konzern und seinen Niederlassun-
gen in Ungarn und Polen analysiert das Papier, wie es zu einer solchen Einbettung kommt und wel-
chen Bedingungen sie unterliegt. Die Analyse zeigt, dass bestimmte Interaktionsdynamiken in allen 
untersuchten Niederlassungen auf unilaterale Managemententscheidungen oder die Einbeziehung 
lokaler Akteure zurückzuführen sind. Darüber hinaus erleichtert die soziale Interaktion zwischen 
Unternehmen und lokalen Akteuren die Institutionenbildung von der Basis aufwärts. Im Ergebnis 
werden multinationale Unternehmen durch soziale Interaktionen vor Ort zu legitimen Akteuren, die 
zur Institutionenbildung in einem Umfeld beitragen, in dem die Verankerung von Arbeitsstandards 
und Traditionen der Mitbestimmung weniger verbreitet ist als im Westen Kontinentaleuropas.
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Introduction
After the fall of state socialism, countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) ex-
perienced a significant internationalization of their economies. An increased inflow 
of foreign investors, including multinational companies (MNCs), brought a range of 
new employment opportunities to the region (UNCTAD 2007). In consequence, the 
diversity of organizational practices at workplaces in Central and Eastern Europe, e.g. 
working time organization, flexibility, motivation of employees, and hiring and firing 
procedures, has been growing. Some MNCs provide working conditions that exceed 
local standards, while other firms seemingly want to benefit from loose regulations and 
cheap labor in CEE countries (Bohle/Greskovits 2006; Schiffer 1996). 
The internationalization of the economy through MNCs has not only stimulated a 
growing variation in organizational practices, but also fueled a growing diversity of ac-
tors capable of shaping and challenging work standards in the labor markets of postso-
cialist countries. This raises the question of how foreign actors, in particular MNCs, be-
come capable of shaping work norms, and how local actors become capable of shaping 
MNCs’ organizational practices in CEE subsidiaries. In other words, the question posed 
above can be reformulated as understanding MNC embedding – the process through 
which MNCs establish and reinforce their position in host-country labor markets and 
societies. 
This paper offers a theoretical and empirical inquiry into the process of MNC embed-
ding. In particular, I seek to answer two questions. The first one aims at theoretically 
understanding how MNC embedding occurs, and how the theoretical logic helps elu-
cidate the actual embedding process in postsocialist countries. Instead of studying the 
mode through which MNCs initially made their investments in CEE host countries, I 
explore ongoing micro-level interaction between MNCs and relevant local actors af-
ter years of subsidiary operation. As will be explained later, social interaction between 
MNCs and local actors is at the core of the embedding process. To support the first 
question, the paper’s second question aims at uncovering the conditions facilitating 
MNC embedding. In particular, I analyze the compatibility of influences that originate 
in the large transnational organizational entity like an MNC, on the one hand, and in 
the host-country environment and its actors, on the other. 
An economic perspective on MNC embedding suggests that MNCs interact with local 
actors in relation to their economic interest and utilization of host-country institutions, 
in order to directly achieve profitability. MNCs are thus expected to adopt best work 
practices that have proved to be efficient elsewhere and are feasible for securing the 
firm’s profitability. In consequence, MNC embedding in host countries is likely to oc-
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cur through instrumental market-like relationships with local actors, in which institu-
tions and the social structure serve merely as a context for economic behavior (Bandelj 
2008b). From this position, MNCs may become legitimate actors involved in shaping 
general work standards by means of competitive work practices, which serve as bench-
marks for local employers. 
In contrast to the above economic logic, this paper adopts a sociological perspective to 
argue that MNC embedding in host-country societies is a socially constituted process. 
The social constitution of embedding does not fundamentally conflict with the firms’ 
profit aspirations and thus the economic perspective. Rather, it draws attention to the 
complex way in which actors’ decisions take place beyond limited, profit-driven consid-
erations. In numerous decisions concerning which work practices to adopt and how to 
shape local standards, repeated patterns of social interaction between MNCs and host-
country actors extend beyond pure economic issues and serve as a broader channel 
for MNCs to develop local influence. In other words, embedding does not only occur 
within the purely economic context of market competition, and the economic behavior 
of MNCs is influenced by factors outside the economy as well. 
An empirical underpinning of the analysis derives from a comparative case study of the 
behavior of a Dutch industrial MNC, and its interaction with host-country actors1 in 
the firm’s Hungarian and Polish subsidiaries. The paper is confined to a theoretical and 
empirical scrutiny of the social interaction process between the MNC and host-country 
actors relevant for the construction of work practices in MNC subsidiaries. Adopted 
work practices are thus viewed as one of the particular outcomes of MNC embedding.
Two arguments are developed. First, different forms of social interaction represent dif-
ferent paths of MNC embedding. Particular interaction dynamics between the MNC 
and local actors in the Hungarian and Polish subsidiaries account for the boundaries 
between two particular embedding paths. The first one is MNC embedding and the 
construction of subsidiary work practices via unilateral managerial decisions. The sec-
ond one is embedding with the direct involvement of local labor market actors. Both 
of these embedding paths consider the MNC’s economic interest and the social and 
institutional influences constituting MNC behavior. In other words, in both paths the 
MNC’s economic behavior is socially constructed. However, the two paths diverge on 
the role of particular actors in the embedding process. In the former, unilateral path, 
the steering of the embedding process remains within the organizational boundaries of 
the MNC. In the latter, interactive path, embedding occurs through greater involvement 
of local actors. The conditions influencing and facilitating MNC embedding, in par-
ticular through the participation of local actors, demand compatibility between several 
resources: the MNC’s corporate values and profit interest, host-country institutions, the 
interests of local actors, and trust between MNCs and locals. 
1 That is, employees, trade unions, employee representatives, and local authorities.
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The second argument is that social interaction allows MNCs to benefit from local insti-
tutional resources. Therefore, MNCs become institutional rule-takers in the host coun-
tries (Streeck/Thelen 2005). At the same time, interaction creates space for the MNC 
to become a legitimate actor contributing to institution building in host-country labor 
markets, or an institutional rule-maker. Social interaction between MNCs and local ac-
tors thus facilitates institution building at the micro level in postsocialist countries that 
lack extensive legal or collective regulation of work issues at the macro level.
The paper is structured as follows. In the first section, I outline the theoretical framework 
for embedding. The second section introduces the case study and research methods. In 
the third section, evidence on social interaction in the Hungarian and Polish cases is 
presented and analyzed. The fourth section examines conditions of social interaction, 
in particular the compatibility of organizational interests with institutional conditions 
in CEE host countries. In the fifth section, I seek to uncover the implications of social 
interaction between MNCs and local actors for institution building in CEE countries. 
Section six presents my conclusions. 
1 A theoretical framework for embedding
Because of their ability to draw on multiple resources and operate simultaneously 
in differing host-country environments, MNCs represent the organizational face of 
the internationalization and transmission of work practices across borders (Geppert/
Mayer 2006; Rubery/Grimshaw 2003). In the embedding process, MNCs evaluate their 
corporate interests relative to economic, social, and institutional conditions existing 
in the host countries. Next to the firm’s economic interest, the social, cultural, and 
institutional conditions in the host countries shape the way in which MNCs interact 
with host-country actors, negotiate and deploy their subsidiary work practices, and 
develop a legitimate role in shaping host-country work standards (Ferner/Quintanilla/
Sánchez-Runde 2006; Maurice/Sorge 2000; Michailova 2003). Therefore, the social, 
cultural, and institutional conditions of host countries are important enablers of MNC 
embedding there. 
Current comparative institutionalist literature on MNCs recognizes the influence of 
host-country forces on MNC economic behavior (Maurice/Sorge 2000; Michailova 
2003; Rosenzweig/Nohria 1994; Rubery/Grimshaw 2003). Among the recognized influ-
ences are government policies and institutional pressures that coerce MNCs to imitate 
practices that are common in local companies (Bandelj 2008b; Ferner/Quintanilla 1998; 
Guillén 2000; Zukin/DiMaggio 1990). It is argued that, due to diverse influences, MNCs 
may diffuse work practices across a number of subsidiaries, adapt to host-country stan-
dards by imitating practices of other locally established firms, produce reverse diffusion 
from host countries to home-country subsidiaries, or attempt to hybridize subsidiary 
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work practices by combining the best of home and host-country influences (Boyer et al. 
1998; Edwards 1998; Ferner/Varul 2000; Tüselmann/McDonald/Heise 2003). 
Despite the literature’s contribution to understanding the expected and real outcomes 
of MNC embedding, little is known about the embedding process itself. Within eco-
nomic influences, politics, culture, and institutions, the relevant theoretical challenge 
shifts from questioning whether MNCs are embedded to understanding how MNC 
embedding occurs. Assuming that economic actors are associated with and influence 
one another (Swedberg/Smelser 2005), two theoretical logics apply to the embedding 
process. The first one is embedding as unilateral managerial action and competition-
driven interaction with host-country actors. The second logic is embedding as a rela-
tional social process, shaped simultaneously by various social forces and host-country 
actors (Bandelj 2008b). These two logics imply a different kind of interaction between 
MNCs and local actors, or the embedding processes, in constructing work practices and 
work standards that are seen as the outcomes of embedding. 
The first perspective assumes rational economic action on the part of MNCs, which 
decide a priori what the best organizational practices are and diffuse them across sev-
eral subsidiaries in different host countries. MNC interaction with host-country actors 
is driven by an effort to maximize profit. In consequence, MNCs become embedded in 
host-country societies predominantly through competition-driven arm’s length inter-
action with host-country labor market actors. The interaction develops around accom-
modating MNCs’ best organizational practices, imported from foreign subsidiaries, into 
the specific social and institutional situation of host-country labor markets. Despite the 
fact that MNC embedding is assumed to occur through a genuine market type of inter-
action with host-country actors,2 this interaction is not isolated from the influence of 
host-country social forces that are non-economic in nature (i.e. social networks, host 
country institutions, political and cultural considerations). However, according to this 
perspective, the effect of social forces is perceived only as a context constraining the 
MNCs’ rational instrumentalist behavior (Bandelj 2008b: 170). 
In contrast to the above logic based on rational calculations of costs and benefits, the 
second perspective on embedding sees host-country social forces, i.e. social networks, 
institutions, and culture, as constitutive of the embedding process (Zukin/DiMaggio 
1990). In this view, MNCs do not necessarily see the influence of social forces as curbing 
their profit aspirations. Instead, through social interaction with local actors, the firms 
seek to utilize local social forces in order to become an active part of the host country’s 
social structure. Therefore, MNC embedding in host-country societies is a socially con-
stituted process, which helps us understand the emergence of stable markets and work 
norms (c. f. Fligstein 1996). Seeking embeddedness with the help of local social forces 
2 A market type of social interaction is used interchangeably with a competition type of interac-
tion. Both are based on short-term arm’s length interactions, without any longer commitment 
to joint goals on the part of the actors involved other than for profit-making reasons. 
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may not be in conflict with the firm’s profit aspirations, but rather determines a kind 
of social interaction between MNCs and local actors that is different from the one that 
would result from taking a narrowly economic perspective. 
Economic sociology has articulated that economic actors’ market behavior is in fact so-
cial behavior, and that an encompassing sociological perspective is necessary to under-
stand economic action (Bandelj 2008b; Fligstein 1996; Granovetter 2005). Applying this 
reasoning to MNC embedding, I argue that the latter, sociological, perspective better 
reflects the complex reality of organizational decision-making vis-à-vis host-country 
conditions. Thus, in this paper, I use a sociological framework emphasizing in particu-
lar the notion that social interaction between MNCs and host-country actors, as a mul-
tifaceted network of social relations, constitutes MNC embedding. The social relations 
involved are not limited to profit-making on the part of MNCs, but involve interactions 
that relate both to market and non-market types of relations. In this respect, the process 
of MNC embedding through social interaction with host-country actors corresponds 
to an embedded perspective on economic action, situated between an undersocialized 
and oversocialized perspective on firm behavior (Granovetter 1985). 
To further justify the use of the sociological framework, we need to elaborate the reasons 
why MNCs seek social interaction with host-country actors. Two broadly acknowledged 
reasons relate to embedding. First, in line with organizational resource dependence the-
ory, MNCs seek to utilize host-country institutions and actors to obtain new resources 
(Cook 1977; Pfeffer/Salancik 1978). This is important, since the supplies of resources 
are not stable and environments change. Therefore, to achieve their goals, firms seek 
capacities to influence host-country actors from whom resources are acquired (Pfeffer 
1992: 38). The motive to acquire local resources is closely related to the second reason, 
which is to combat the uncertainty associated with host-country conditions and ac-
tors’ behavior. Uncertainty can be reformulated as a situation of double contingency 
in which actors do not know what is best to do, and therefore their actions are recipro-
cally dependent on each other (Beckert 1996: 805). The available literature distinguishes 
between three kinds of uncertainty.3 First, substantive uncertainty refers to a lack of 
information on host countries required by MNCs to make decisions or predict their 
outcomes (Dosi/Egidi 1991; Troy/Werle 2008). Second, procedural uncertainty relates 
to cognitive constraints or a competence gap on the part of MNCs that limits their 
ability to pursue their desired interests (Dosi/Egidi 1991). Finally, strategic uncertainty 
refers to incomplete information on the strategies and behavior of host-country ac-
tors in response to MNC behavior (Iida 1993; Troy/Werle 2008). Overall, MNCs face a 
high degree of uncertainty in host countries because they lack local knowledge, cannot 
anticipate the outcome of certain decisions or actors’ behavior, or cannot assign prob-
abilities to the outcome (Beckert 1996: 804). To overcome this, they seek social interac-
tion in given institutional, social, and cultural conditions. Therefore, social interaction 
3 The distinction between different uncertainties serves the analytical purpose of justifying the pa-
per’s focus on social interaction. A study of uncertainty itself is beyond the scope of this paper.
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with host-country actors is an integral part of how MNCs handle their organizational 
practices in foreign subsidiaries and how they embed among host-country labor market 
actors (Bandelj 2008b; Zukin/DiMaggio 1990). Moreover, a focus on social interaction 
helps to overcome the implicit assumption of the unitary character of managerial ac-
tion found in the MNC literature by allowing an assessment to be made of local actor 
influence on MNC embedding and its outcomes.
Addressing uncertainty is particularly relevant in postsocialist CEE countries, because 
cultural conceptions of work practices, conditions for doing business, and practices of 
employing people in Central and Eastern Europe differ from Western European coun-
tries – the home countries of most MNCs with subsidiaries in the CEE area.4 Postso-
cialist countries tend to exhibit some degree of institutional intransparency; compared 
to Western European countries, for example, they often lack collective regulation of 
labor issues and work practices. In these circumstances, MNCs may appreciate local 
knowledge of business and employment relations, informal norms, and the interests of 
host-country actors, which they obtain through social interaction. 
Having established the role of social interaction in MNC embedding, I now turn to the 
elaboration of concepts that constitute the paper’s theoretical framework. I start with 
identifying actors and the attributes of their behavior. Next, I conceptualize social in-
teraction and expected interaction forms under the influence of firm interests, values, 
and host-country social forces. Finally, I elaborate expectations of how different forms 
of social interaction denote different means of MNC embedding. 
Actors and their attributes
MNCs as multi-divisional corporate actors incorporate a heterogeneity of organiza-
tional interests and are not limited to a single goal of profitability (Scott 2000; Grandori 
1987; Phelan/Lewin 2000; Turner 1991). The structure of interests and the nature of 
internal divisions can directly influence company strategies and has an indirect impact 
on the preferences and strategies of host-country actors that engage in social interac-
tion with MNCs (c. f. Avdagic/Rhodes/Visser 2005: 15). For example, the strategies of 
local trade unions can differ when unions face an MNC with a clear set of coherent 
interests throughout its subsidiaries, or an MNC with ad hoc strategies that are formed 
or concretized predominantly at the subsidiary level.
Next, the economic behavior of MNCs cannot be isolated from company culture or 
from internal moral values and orientations (Scharpf 1997). Company values are broad 
4 Using the World Investment Report, Bandelj (2008b: 106–109) lists investors in CEE countries 
by country of origin. Western European investors have invested in the CEE region to the greatest 
extent. In Hungary and Poland, German and Dutch investors occupy the top spots. 
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tendencies to prefer certain states of affairs over others (Hofstede 1981) formed in a 
path-dependent legacy of organizational procedure, or administrative heritage (Bart-
lett/Ghoshal 2002). They shape company preferences for specific work practices in 
specific host-country conditions. Values can therefore account, regardless of the com-
pany’s genuine profit interests, for both the way an MNC interacts with host-country 
actors,and its willingness to engage host-country actors in its decisions on work prac-
tices.5 It will be argued later that company values are indeed crucial for the kind of 
interaction observed in the case study between the MNC and host-country actors in 
Hungary and Poland. 
MNC behavior is also greatly influenced by societal and institutional effects (Bandelj 
2008a; Dequech 2003; Ferner 1997; Maurice/Sorge 2000; Uzzi 1996). I stress two ways 
in which societal and institutional factors constitute MNC embedding. First, the society 
concerned imposes normative institutional constraints and creates maneuvering space 
for rational behavior (Scharpf 1997; Streeck 1997; Tempel/Wächter/Walgenbach 2006). 
The MNC embeds itself in this institutional space in order to find the optimal way 
of functioning under given conditions (Maurice/Sorge 2000; Sellier 2000). In conse-
quence, MNCs are obliged to respect the statutory labor regulations or to practice col-
lective bargaining if legally stipulated. The second effect is that the exposure of MNCs 
to local actors leads to an exchange of values and emerging trust, which fuels social 
interaction even beyond imposed constraints and formal institutional spaces. Social in-
teraction taking place in daily informal settings may foster commitment to joint agree-
ments and the emergence of informal institutions. Such agreements are often enacted 
through social engagements beyond the formal institutional framework (Krippner et al. 
2004). Voluntary commitments achieved through social interaction are maintained for 
reasons of legitimacy, uncertainty, or hidden costs in case of non-compliance. 
Host-country actors with whom the MNC interacts in its embedding process do not di-
rectly take part in constructing subsidiary work practices, but are important for setting 
norms and benchmarks of appropriate behavior in particular conditions. In this paper 
I focus on those corporate/collective actors that are involved in shaping work practices 
in general and in MNC subsidiaries in particular. These include the MNC’s subsidiary 
management as well as trade unions, employees, labor market organizations in host 
cities, and public authorities. The latter group of actors is referred to as local actors. 
Understanding the relationship of MNCs with these actors also helps to see corporate 
interests and behavior in broader social settings of the host country. 
5 An alternative to this behavior is to leave host-country actors out of the organization’s bounda-
ries and to develop a more exploitative and market-like employment relationship and practice 
(Pfeffer 2006; Williamson 1975).
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Social interaction 
Actors’ behavior, informed by the diverse influences discussed above, encounters other 
actors’ behavior in social interaction. Interaction can be broadly defined as a repeated 
situation where the behavior of one actor is shaped by, and influences the behavior of, 
another actor and vice versa (Turner 1988: 13–14; Weber 1978). Social interaction can 
neither be separated from the actors’ own attributes nor from institutional conditions 
in which interaction takes place (Scharpf 1997). 
The understanding of social interaction in this paper applies to organizations rather 
than individual actors. Therefore, I refrain from examining actions like signaling, sense-
making, frame-making, or ritual-making, which are inherent features of the theory of 
social interaction applied to individuals (Turner 1988: 102–117). This theory is valuable, 
however, in rethinking interaction features applicable to organizations. In consequence, 
my understanding of social interaction lies between a strict micro perspective, as noted 
above, and a macro perspective limited to obligatory encounters of MNCs with host-
country actors because of formal institutional requirements (i.e. collective bargaining). 
In particular, I assume that a formal social structure between the MNC and local actors 
co-exists with informal relations. Daily interaction between managers and representa-
tives of employees, trade unions, and local authorities is equally important for MNC 
embedding – both for the work practices of MNCs and for MNC influence on local work 
standards (Whitley 1999). Even when work practices tend to be regulated by formalized 
institutions (i.e. labor law and written employment contracts), trust is important in 
everyday interactions between workers, managers, and trade unions because it may fa-
cilitate work practices beyond formal rules or practices that differ from actors’ original 
intentions (Fox 1974). Thus, both formal and informal social interaction matters for 
MNC embedding and its outcomes in the form of work practices in subsidiaries.
Building on the notion that social interaction constitutes MNC embedding, the next 
logical step is to theorize how social interaction occurs. It is assumed that interaction 
can take various forms and thus affect actor behavior and MNC embedding differently. 
For an analytical distinction of interaction forms, I draw on existing literature that has 
conceptualized four interaction forms (Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Anal-
ysis 1997), including control, competition, value-based cooperation, and interactive 
bargaining. These interaction forms do not distinguish MNC behavior as embedded 
or not. Rather, they relate to different actor conceptions of control over the embedding 
process (c. f. Fligstein 1996) and serve as analytical guidelines for the paper’s empiri-
cal section. In reality, several forms of interaction can simultaneously emerge between 
MNCs and local actors. As the strength of different forms may vary, I aim to identify 
the dominant interaction form for MNC interaction with different host-country actors 
(Kahancová/Meer 2006). 
Interaction in the form of control entails the economic or legal power of an actor to 
make decisions and impose them on others (Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy 
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Analysis 1997: 57). In interaction between MNCs and host-country actors, control is 
associated with the enforcement of MNCs’ corporate interests and the diffusion of best 
organizational practices, regardless of the social environment and interests of local ac-
tors. The MNC strives to leave external actors out of its organizational boundaries and 
to maintain control over its specific decisions on work practices and its involvement 
in the host country’s social structure (Pfeffer 2006; Williamson 1975). An important 
aspect of control is power asymmetry, with MNCs having great power to make and 
execute decisions on which local actors have little or no impact. 
The second interaction form considered is competition, entailing rivalry between actors 
that strive for resources and goals that not everyone can obtain (Netherlands Bureau for 
Economic Policy Analysis 1997: 56). In this interaction form, actors are equally endowed 
with power, and therefore one of them (i.e. the MNC) cannot impose its interests on 
the other actors (i.e. host-country locals). Competition can be found between actors at 
the same level of hierarchy, and between those not directly and extensively dependent 
on each other’s resources. Competing actors are willing to compromise over issues of 
common interest at the price of threats and large concessions. Competition can lead to 
an identification of feasible work practices and their efficient allocation. However, in 
competing, MNCs are not committed to the interest of locals (and vice versa); all actors 
only attempt to pursue what they believe to be their own rational interest. This leads to 
decreased trust and less commitment to mutual agreements, and prevents MNC em-
bedding with any serious cooperative involvement of local actors. 
Cooperation based on shared values and norms, the third social interaction form, de-
velops on the basis of a congruent set of preferences between MNCs and local actors 
(Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 1997: 57). Actors are motivated and 
committed to sharing values and a common interest, which may or may not be in align-
ment with the profit aspirations of the MNC. Value-based cooperation is vulnerable to 
quick failure when actors start to prefer individual rational egoism. Therefore, actors’ 
trust, voluntary commitment, and conscious self-enforcement, even in a situation with-
out external norms, are central for maintaining this form of social interaction (c. f. Greif 
2006; Greif/Milgrom/Weingast 1995). MNCs that prefer value-based cooperation be-
lieve that engaging host-country actors in the embedding process is better than learning 
the rules of the foreign environment alone. Organizational values, culture, and moral 
considerations underpin the actors’ preference for value-based cooperation. Therefore, 
this form of interaction is not merely the result of an opportunistic decision to yield 
higher profits than those provided by alternative forms of interaction. Even if the in-
terests of the MNC and the local actors differ on structural issues, actors can develop 
value-based cooperation because they have similar interests, i.e. a commitment to ethi-
cal behavior and socially acceptable work practices. 
The final form of social interaction is interactive bargaining, which involves consulta-
tion between actors with different interests (Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy 
Analysis 1997: 58). Actors are informed about and responsive to each other’s interests 
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regardless of their power relations. They are motivated to stay alert and innovative and 
to exploit existing opportunities in order to achieve their goals and obtain the desired 
resources. Interactive bargaining may well be observed in workplace industrial rela-
tions in MNC subsidiaries, especially in cases of bargained or informally settled deals 
between employers and trade unions. In contrast to interaction in the form of com-
petition, bargaining leads to compromises, concessions, and satisfactory outcomes of 
interaction (Cappelli 1985). In analytical terms, interactive bargaining has a distributive 
and an integrative element (c. f. Avdagic/Rhodes/Visser 2005; Walton/McKersie 1965). 
Distributive bargaining implies compromises and trade-offs between actors regarding 
the overall distribution of benefits from agreed behavior and outcomes. In this case, 
interaction may incorporate greater power differences and larger compromises. In in-
tegrative bargaining, actors strive for an outcome that makes everyone better off. Com-
promises are reached with fewer difficulties than in distributive bargaining. 
Social interaction forms as means of MNC embedding
What kind of expectations regarding MNC embedding can we derive from the interac-
tion forms described above? Each interaction form may affect the behavior of the ac-
tors involved, and thus the MNC’s embedding, differently. When interaction between 
the MNC and local actors evolves predominantly in the form of control, the MNC has 
less of a need to consult or negotiate its practices with local actors. Even when facing 
uncertainty, the MNC will define the goals it is seeking to achieve in the host country 
(i.e. its own position in the local labor market relative to given opportunities and con-
straints, and the specific work practices to be deployed in subsidiaries) and will attempt 
to reach these unilaterally. Thus, MNC embedding is predominantly a unilateral process 
to which local actors do not have direct extensive access. Given the limited encounters 
with local actors, the MNC is free to decide whether it aims to build a strong local pres-
ence and commitment to the investment location. Conflicts, compromises, trust, and 
value sharing do not develop to the same extent as in other forms of interaction. 
In case of interaction in the form of competition, MNC embedding is likely to occur 
with a greater involvement of local actors. Given the fundamentally different interests 
but comparable power resources of locals and MNCs, local actors can hinder unilateral 
MNC-determined embedding. Conflicts, threats, trade-offs, and lack of trust between 
the MNC and local actors are expected to be inherent features of embedding, in par-
ticular in bargaining over work practices. 
In contrast to control and competition, value-based interaction yields fewer conflicts 
and less dominance because there is an established shared opinion and moral convic-
tion on issues of joint interest. In this case, the MNC is expected to benefit from local 
knowledge and the resources of local actors. The ongoing interaction, both formal and 
informal, accordingly accounts for the incremental embedding of the MNC in the social 
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structure of local actors. Moreover, during the embedding process, informal institu-
tions may emerge due to trust and cooperation between the firm and the locals. These 
may gradually modify the established rules on work standards and thus contribute to 
an actor-driven institutional change from below. 
Finally, interactive bargaining may characterize two options within a bargained process 
of embedding. The first option is distributive bargaining, where the MNC and local ac-
tors undergo tough negotiations before a compromise on work practices is reached. The 
second option is integrative bargaining, where actors are committed to negotiate such 
work practices that make both the MNC and local actors well off in terms of address-
ing their interests (Walton/McKersie 1965). The final embedding process is contingent 
on actors’ attributes (i.e. organizational culture, values, economic interest), their will-
ingness to accommodate additional commitments and compromises in their original 
goals, or a lack of any initial goals whatsoever. Whatever the case, the MNC may benefit 
from the knowledge of host-country actors in overcoming uncertainty to become one 
of the relevant players in host-country labor markets. But the extent to which local ac-
tors are involved in MNC decisions and practices can vary. Given the variety of possible 
outcomes, an empirical underpinning is essential to formulate conclusions on interac-
tive bargaining and MNC embedding. 
To summarize, the theoretical framework maintains that social interaction between 
MNCs and host-country actors constitutes MNC embedding. Through social interac-
tion, MNCs encounter host-country actors and institutions that help them to combat 
uncertainty and acquire new resources. In addition, through social interaction, MNCs 
become embedded in the host country’s labor market and influence local work stan-
dards. Interaction may thus lead to incremental institution building or micro-level in-
stitutional change. Building on this analytical framework, the next sections provide an 
empirical underpinning of MNC embedding. I examine embedding by exploring forms 
of interaction between a case-study MNC and local actors in two host countries, Hun-
gary and Poland. In terms of the content of embedding and related social interaction, I 
focus on how work practices in the MNC’s Hungarian and Polish subsidiaries are con-
structed through the actors involved, and how the MNC’s presence and subsidiary work 
practices help shape local standards in work practices. 
2 Case study and research methodology
The empirical part of the paper draws on a comparative case study of a single MNC and 
its two subsidiaries, one in Hungary and one in Poland. The chosen qualitative com-
parative approach is valid for two reasons. First, it allows an analysis of the embedding 
process to be made through a set of interrelated phenomena in controlled organization-
al settings (c.f. Boxall 1993; Dyer 1984; Edwards/Colling/Ferner 2007; Truss et al. 1997). 
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Second, the chosen methodology is feasible for studying how host-country conditions 
inform actors’ behavior, social interaction, and embedding. 
The company studied (hereafter referred to by the pseudonym Multico) is a leading 
Dutch MNC in electronics, lighting, and medical equipment. Multico was established 
in the late nineteenth century as a small family light-bulb business. In the past, the firm 
operated as a decentralized entity with a portfolio of independent businesses that aimed 
at exploiting local conditions (Bartlett/Ghoshal 2002). However, the past 20 years have 
shifted the company’s organization toward a more integrated structure, with strength-
ened ties between formerly independent organizational units. 
Multico has been operating a number of subsidiaries in Central and Eastern Europe 
since the early 1990s. The two subsidiaries examined in this paper assemble televisions 
and home entertainment products in Hungary and Poland. Although their production 
is not identical, the two factories are comparable because they are part of the same prod-
uct division within the MNC’s organizational structure and have the same coordination 
distance from headquarters. Both subsidiaries were established in 1991 and gradually 
evolved from small industrial sites into mass production centers with an outstanding 
performance record. New technologically advanced products are slowly entering into 
the production plans of Multico Hungary (hereafter MHU), whereas Multico Poland 
(hereafter MPL)6 continues to assemble mainstream televisions. 
Hungary and Poland were among the first countries in Central and Eastern Europe to 
introduce laws on private property and attract a significant amount of the total foreign 
direct investments post 1989 (Bandelj 2008b; UNCTAD 2006). Both MHU and MPL are 
key employers in their regions. Employment at MHU totaled 2,400 employees in 2004, 
with 91 percent working in production. MPL’s headcount in 2003 oscillated according 
to production seasonality between 800 and 1,000 employees, the majority of employees 
being production workers. The main difference between the two host countries is the 
unemployment rate in the cities where Multico subsidiaries are located. MHU is located 
in a highly developed industrial region with low unemployment (around 4.9 percent in 
2004; Székesfehérvár Labor Market Board 2005) and is therefore constantly experienc-
ing labor shortages, especially in seasons with intensive production. In contrast, MPL, 
along with other foreign investors, is one of the key employers in a small Polish town 
with 27 percent unemployment (in 2003; Kwidzyn Labor Market Board 2004). The 
surrounding regions in Poland have even higher unemployment levels. These external 
conditions are an important resource for the strategies of trade unions, workers, and 
Multico’s management – actors with the greatest influence on work practices through 
their social interaction with each other. 
6 MPL, until recently the best performing Multico television factory in the world, was outsourced 
to an American investor shortly after this research was completed. The factory continues to 
produce televisions under Multico’s brand name. 
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Multico is a firm with a declared paternalism toward workers and a responsiveness to 
the conditions prevailing in the host countries (Stoop 1992; Bartlett/Ghoshal 2002). 
These precepts have constituted the core of Multico’s corporate value system ever since 
the company’s establishment and its early operation in rural Netherlands.7 Despite a 
number of strategic reorganizations in the past decades, Multico’s economic behavior is 
continuously informed by these values. In consequence, the MNC does not impose best 
organizational practices or attempt to embed itself by controlling or competing with 
local actors. Instead, the firm voluntarily negotiates its local role with host-country ac-
tors, thereby learning which practices work best in given conditions and adjusting the 
embedding process accordingly. 
Although the outcomes of embedding encompass a number of dimensions, this paper is 
confined to the study of the work practices of production workers at MHU and MPL.8 
These practices are viewed as a particular outcome of embedding, because they have 
been constructed through actor social interaction under given host-country conditions. 
The work practices addressed in the empirical analysis of embedding encompass hard 
and soft practices (Truss et al. 1997). Hard work practices, such as wages, working time, 
headcount changes, presence of temporary workers, and workplace rotation directly 
relate to labor costs and flexibility. Soft practices derive from company values, social 
relations at the workplace, and the psychological contract between the firm and its em-
ployees (Rousseau/Robinson 1994). They include motivation, worker empowerment 
and participation, and fringe benefits. 
Work standards and labor market conditions in CEE host countries differ greatly from 
Western Europe, where Multico’s headquarters and other subsidiaries are located. The 
CEE region offers a more liberal and market-driven institutional context for company 
practices (Bohle/Greskovits 2006; Bohle/Greskovits 2007; Danis 2003; Meardi 2006; 
Whitley et al. 1997). This is obvious, for instance, in the frequent use of workplace 
competition and performance-related pay (Sagie/Koslowsky 2000; Whitley et al. 1997). 
Despite the enactment of new labor laws, legal enforcement and sanction mechanisms 
lack strong institutionalization (Bluhm 2006).9 In consequence, legal regulation in 
Hungary and Poland leaves significant room for individual employers to benefit from 
the autonomy they enjoy over the construction of work practices. This situation reflects 
developments in the transition period after 1989, when real wages dropped, firm-based 
social benefits disappeared, and union density halved (Bohle/Greskovits 2007). The ex-
isting fragmentation and organizational weakness of trade unions prevents their influ-
7 Multico developed its own social and personnel policy in 1917. This included healthcare provi-
sions, housing, pension plans, and the creation of a personnel department. In 1918, an 8-hour 
working day was introduced, and the company promised to respect public holidays based on 
Catholic feast days (Stoop 1992). 
8 These workers constitute the largest share of the MHU and MPL workforces and are directly 
associated with the subsidiaries’ main economic activity.
9 Poland has adopted laws stipulating trade union rights; however, the real trade union power is 
contingent upon particular employers’ willingness to engage in bargaining.
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ence over national public policy and coordinated collective bargaining (Avdagic 2005; 
Meardi 2006). If bargaining takes place at all, it is predominantly at the company or 
workplace level, with mixed evidence for cooperation and conflict and the marginaliza-
tion of unions (Frege 2000). 
The analysis of Multico’s embedding in the host-country conditions in Hungary and 
Poland is based on face-to-face interviews with management, trade unions, and local 
labor market organizations. I conducted all the interviews in 2004 and 2005. The fol-
lowing sections present and analyze evidence of Multico’s embedding in line with the 
analytical perspective adopted.
3 Embedding through social interaction in MNC subsidiaries
Derived from long-established company values, Multico’s headquarters maintain a 
transnational mindset that subsidiaries should tailor corporate interests to differing 
host-country conditions (Bartlett/Ghoshal 2002). However, in Multico’s case this mind-
set does not merely mean adapting organizational practices to host-country standards. 
Instead, the firm’s embedding simultaneously leads to a development of novel practices, 
using local resources.
Outcomes of embedding
Before discussing the actual embedding process, I will briefly present the outcomes of 
this process in terms of selected subsidiary work practices at MHU and MPL.10 Adopt-
ing host-country standards without any attempt to innovate or to circumvent them is 
most extensive in regard to hard work practices, such as wages and numerical flexibility 
(fluctuations in overall workforce size). Regarding other practices, namely employment 
contract flexibility, working time organization, and the allocation of workers to specific 
tasks, Multico has developed a range of unique arrangements, utilizing the host coun-
tries’ statutory regulations and work standards. 
10 This section selectively addresses particular work practices. Table 1 in the Appendix provides a 
more detailed overview of work practices at MHU and MPL, along with an evaluation of their 
similarity to the other subsidiary studied and to local standards in Hungary and Poland. 
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Host-country market pressures and statutory regulation have a lesser influence on soft 
work practices than on wages and flexibility. Soft practices, such as flat hierarchies at the 
workplace, informal relations between management and workers, and generous fringe 
benefits, are an outcome of Multico’s paternalist organizational culture and social in-
teraction with local actors at the workplace. Multico has long been perceived as a social 
employer offering well-paid jobs, employment security, housing, health care, educa-
tion, and socio-cultural services for employees in its home country, the Netherlands 
(Meer 2000; Stoop 1992). I have argued elsewhere that the paternalist corporate culture 
has been transposed to CEE subsidiaries, but its concrete form is determined locally 
(Kahancová 2007). The consequence of paternalism and local responsiveness in postso-
cialist host countries is that, in Poland, Multico tends to provide better work practices 
than those found in benchmark Polish companies (Kohl/Platzer 2004; Sagie/Koslowsky 
2000). In Hungary, Multico’s practices match the Hungarian standards to a great extent, 
but exceed them in terms of relatively generous fringe benefits, direct employee partici-
pation, and institutionalization of performance evaluations (Whitley et al. 1997). This 
makes MHU an attractive place to work, despite high flexibility in working time and 
contracts and the abundance of other job opportunities in the region.
A range of work practices in Multico’s subsidiaries have been adopted through (formal 
and informal) bargaining with local actors, in particular workers and trade unions. The 
willingness to become involved in interaction with local actors squares with Multico’s 
corporate interest in being responsive to host-country conditions and local resources. 
Apart from differences between Multico’s practices and those of other locally established 
firms, the MNC’s interest in local responsiveness has also generated differences between 
MHU and MPL. These include a preference for hiring agency workers at MHU over hir-
ing their own temporary workers at MPL, free rotation within teams (MPL) compared 
to management-determined rotation of workers on the production line (MHU), and 
greater workplace informality at MHU, derived from the Hungarian culture, as opposed 
to more formal relations at MPL. 
In sum, Multico’s work practices in Hungary and Poland resemble local standards in 
some aspects and go beyond these standards in others. This compound outcome of 
MNC embedding applies to both host countries and shows consistency in MNC inter-
ests. However, as shown below, the outcomes at MHU and MPL have been achieved by 
different forms of social interaction between Multico and the host-country actors. The 
different means of embedding derive from the lack of a corporate template for subsid-
iary behavior and, at the same time, the relevance that the firm ascribes to local respon-
siveness. Thus, it is not the inability of the MNC to diffuse organizational best practices 
throughout the subsidiaries, but a voluntary interest in decentralized embedding in line 
with corporate values. According to this mindset, host-country standards constitute a 
benchmark for Multico’s behavior, embedding, and subsidiary practices. 
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Process of embedding 
Multico’s embedding in Hungary and Poland incorporates unilateral managerial action 
and, where applicable, social interaction related to subsidiary work practices with the 
direct involvement of host-country actors. The form of social interaction between Mul-
tico and host countries’ workers, trade unions, and the local society varies according to 
the interests of the actors involved. 
The most important local actor directly influencing work practices is the subsidiary 
workforce. Multico’s daily interaction with workers is important predominantly for soft 
work practices. Different interaction forms apply to different dimensions of manage-
ment–workforce relations. Managerial control over work organization is extensive be-
cause of individualized monthly performance appraisals and team performance com-
petitions. Control is most extensive at MPL due to personal appraisals carried out by 
the workers’ foremen. At MHU, control is extensive but is not associated with specific 
persons. Even if control as a form of social interaction resembles dominance by the 
MNC over local actors and suggests that MNC embedding is occurring with a limited 
influence of local actors, additional forms of management–worker interaction in Mul-
tico’s subsidiaries account for extensive worker involvement in the shaping of subsidi-
ary work practices. 
In practices other than work organization, the influence of workers in both subsidiaries 
is obvious mainly because of established employee participation in management deci-
sion-making through daily informal relations between managers and workers, regular 
informal meetings, worker surveys, and other forms of encouraged worker feedback on 
subsidiary practices. Social interaction, through which these practices emerge and recon-
struct themselves, is best described as interactive bargaining, inclining toward a value-
based exchange of resources between the MNC and workers. In both MHU and MPL, 
Multico collects worker feedback to improve work practices, thus granting workers a say 
in Multico’s decisions. Although similar empowerment ideologies have been criticized 
for imposing company values on workers while feigning interest in workers’ independ-
ent ideas (Michailova 2002), manipulation of workers’ resources has not been found 
in Multico subsidiaries. The fact that Multico considers worker participation a relevant 
resource for managerial decisions improves trust at the workplace and reinforces worker 
involvement in MNC embedding. Moreover, generous fringe benefits at both MHU and 
MPL result from management–worker interaction in the form of value-based coopera-
tion. Even though Multico’s commitment to provide such benefits, without external legal 
or market pressure in the host countries, has a corporate origin, these benefits are devel-
oped locally, through interaction with workers. Therefore, social interaction with work-
ers does facilitate the adoption of specific work practices that utilize host-country re-
sources and, at the same time, square with corporate values. I argue that the construction 
of particular soft work practices in the subsidiaries has resulted from social interaction 
between the MNC and workers. In broader terms, this implies MNC embedding with 
considerable involvement of subsidiary workers. If embedding were to occur through 
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unilateral managerial action, Multico would strive to leave workers out of its organiza-
tional boundaries to acquire full control over local resources (Pfeffer 2006). 
The second host-country actor influencing MNC embedding is local trade unions. 
Management–union interaction concentrates predominantly on hard work practices. 
Negotiations about pay and working time are legally stipulated, but formal resources 
for union involvement are not extensive in either of the two host countries. However, 
the actual union involvement in the construction of MNC work practices exceeds for-
mal stipulations when the informal relationship between managers and unionists is co-
operative. In this respect, interesting differences were observed in management–union 
interaction and thus union involvement in MNC embedding at MHU and MPL. 
In Poland, Multico’s willingness to engage in interaction and, at the same time, the Polish 
unions’ willingness to compromise have contributed to a more cooperative interaction 
than in other locally based companies and other Multico subsidiaries in Poland. Social 
interaction between Multico and the workplace union at MPL has gradually stabilized 
in the form of (mostly informal) interactive bargaining devoid of industrial conflict. 
The parties are committed to discussions and conform to joint agreements, the major-
ity of which lack written formalization and effective sanction mechanisms. The union 
never uses local media to publicize internal matters, which contrasts strongly with the 
situation at MHU. Such conduct is based on a high level of trust and a commitment to 
avoid militant action. In consequence, the trade union is involved not only in annual 
bargaining over pay and working time, but also in a number of operational decisions 
where formal union involvement is not legally stipulated. These include informal work-
ing time revisions, decisions on the length and type of temporary contracts, social cri-
teria for hiring temporary workers, and the provision of fringe benefits. In sum, MPL’s 
management treats union resources as a useful input in the embedding process, even if 
legal obligations or economic incentives to involve unions are not obvious in Poland. 
The management–union interaction is best characterized as value-based cooperation 
(in setting social criteria for hiring temporary workers) and interactive bargaining (in 
other work practices), with informal commitments that both parties respect. This form 
of social interaction reinforces trust and the development of informal institutions, and 
accounts for extensive union involvement in MNC embedding. 
In contrast to MPL, management–union interaction at MHU has been noticeably con-
frontational ever since the subsidiary’s establishment in 1991. Multico claims that the 
current character of interaction can to a large extent be attributed to the union’s inabil-
ity to strike bargaining deals. Due to a number of open conflicts, the situation at MHU 
is best described as social interaction in the form of competition, which lacks shared 
values, trust, and willingness to compromise. Agreements, if reached, involve a num-
ber of concessions from both sides. As a result of this situation, union involvement in 
shaping work practices is considerably lower than at MPL and only marginally exceeds 
Hungarian legal requirements. However, this does not mean that MNC embedding oc-
curs without trade union involvement. Through high membership, the trade union is 
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powerful enough to prevent the MNC from embedding by unilateral managerial action 
and thus exercising control over union resources and interests. In consequence, embed-
ding occurs via competitive interaction, with both actors striving to gain control over 
local resources. Work practices are then constructed according to the interests of the 
more powerful actor.
The third group of local actors relevant for MNC embedding in host countries is the 
local society, comprising municipalities, labor market boards, NGOs, and the media. 
Although these actors do not have a direct effect on Multico’s work practices, their per-
ceptions of Multico’s involvement in developing the local economy and society reveal 
additional evidence of MNC embedding. In the embedding process, interaction with 
the local society thus serves two purposes. First, it allows Multico to assess the needs of 
the local society and respond to them through sponsoring activities, thereby strength-
ening local social ties and building an image of a locally relevant employer.11 Second, 
interaction with the local society improves the legitimacy of MNC activities targeted 
locally (c.f. Beckert 2006; Monshipouri/Welch/Kennedy 2003). In both host countries, 
Multico declares its willingness to contribute to the functioning of local society, to gain 
local knowledge and to benefit from it. Accordingly, the MNC actively involves itself 
in social interaction with representatives of municipalities, labor market authorities, 
schools, hospitals, and social and cultural organizations. More systematic interaction 
has developed after repeated informal encounters between Multico’s managers, mayors, 
and other municipality representatives in Hungary and Poland. Interaction predomi-
nantly takes place in the form of value-based cooperation and interactive bargaining, 
often incorporating informal relations and joint agreements that do not require large 
concessions. Despite the fact that local actors lack the capacity to impose strict stan-
dards on MNC’s local behavior, their expectations are often fulfilled by the MNC. This 
is due to Multico’s corporate values and its willingness to contribute to the local society’s 
development. Examples include Multico’s positive discrimination of disadvantaged la-
bor market groups, i.e. when offering employment to people from poorer families in 
Poland or to those from a local crisis center in Hungary. A further relevant factor in 
understanding Multico’s embedding via interaction with the local society is the limited 
impact of host-country institutions. Since micro-level interaction is not subject to for-
mal regulation, social interaction is to a large extent an outcome of the company’s and 
local actors’ interests. Some impact of local market pressure applies to MPL, because 
another large foreign company located in the same city as MPL invests extensively in its 
local reputation. However, it is unclear whether Multico would be less concerned with 
its local image if market pressures were absent. In fact, they are absent in Hungary, but 
Multico’s embedding through cooperation and interactive bargaining with the local so-
ciety applies to both host countries. 
11 Examples of activities Multico has developed in response to local societies’ needs include spon-
soring English classes in Polish elementary schools, purchasing hospital equipment in Hungary 
and Poland, contributing to theater and sewage system restoration in Hungary, and sponsoring 
the illumination of a historical castle and cathedral in Poland.
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To sum up, in empirical cases of cooperation and interactive bargaining, local actors 
have an extensive impact on MNC embedding and the resulting work practices. More-
over, informal trust-based relations between MNC managers and local actors assist in 
the creation of novel work practices, i.e. employment flexibility, employee participa-
tion, and the statutory rights of workplace trade unions. In contrast, in cases where 
interaction does not lead to compromises or joint goals between the MNC and local 
actors, Multico implements work practices by means of unilateral decision, drawing on 
its own knowledge of local resources. These findings underpin the argument that social 
interaction between Multico and host-country actors is central to the MNC’s embed-
ding process. Although different interaction forms apply to Multico’s interaction with 
different actors, forms of interaction that encompass the mutual exchange of resources 
and trust between involved actors are more frequent than interaction forms with exten-
sive power asymmetry, conflicts of interests, and a lack of trust. Therefore, I argue that 
MNC embedding in the two CEE host countries studied occurs predominantly with the 
involvement of local actors, which confirms the relevance of social forces in constituting 
the economic behavior of MNCs in host countries.
4 Conditions of social interaction: How compatible are organizational  
interests with host-country conditions?
The findings presented in the previous section inspire a deeper theoretical inquiry into 
the conditions under which MNC embedding, constituted by social interaction, is pos-
sible. Such inquiry leads to revisiting theoretical notions of the compatibility of MNC 
organizational interests with host-country actors’ interests and institutions, which are 
addressed by two streams of literature.
 The first one is a strand of earlier globalization theories, which assumes a cross-nation-
al convergence in national business systems and organizational practices. This trend is 
likely to have resulted from increasing global competition, technological advancement, 
and the liberalization of trade and capital movements (Berger/Dore 1996; Kerr et al. 
1962; Womack/Jones/Jones 1991). An implication for the micro-level behavior of actors 
like MNCs is that actors should prefer work practices that have proven economically 
optimal regardless of differing host-country conditions. In other words, this perspective 
assumes a profit-driven rational MNC with instrumentalist behavior (Bandelj 2008b). 
Compatibility between organizational interests and host-country institutions is then 
secured through the firm’s control over weak host-country institutions. 
The evidence presented from Multico’s CEE subsidiaries does not support the instru-
mentalist MNC perspective in favor of convergence in organizational practices and 
a coordinated effort to bypass host-country institutions by importing best practices 
from foreign subsidiaries. Instead of endeavoring to overcome host-country diversity, 
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evidence suggests that MNCs are attempting to incorporate differing host-country re-
sources in the embedding process. They do this via voluntary social interaction with 
workers, trade unions, and the local society through several forms. Embedding is thus 
not limited to unilateral managerial control with the aim to diffuse best organizational 
practices across host countries.
An alternative stream of scholarship, gradually offsetting the convergence thesis and 
gaining in importance over recent decades, is rooted in sociological new institution-
alism and the varieties of capitalism approach (Dore 1991; Hall/Soskice 2001; Hol-
lingsworth/Boyer 1997; Katz/Darbishire 2000; North 1991; Streeck 1992). The general 
argument in this literature is that different institutional settings are able to provide 
an optimal performance of economies. A comparative institutionalist perspective on 
MNCs proposes that, instead of opting for the same work practices in different condi-
tions, MNC practices differ because of home and host-country isomorphism (Almond/
Ferner 2006; Ferner/Quintanilla 2002; Ferner/Quintanilla/Sánchez-Runde 2006; Mau-
rice/Sorge 2000). In this logic, the compatibility between organizational interests and 
host-country conditions is secured through institutional pressures, coercing MNCs to 
adapt to local standards. The actual interest of the MNC in diffusion has been rarely 
questioned in this literature.
Postsocialist countries in CEE lack a strong institutional framework, i.e. legal stipu-
lations and strong collective bargaining systems facilitating particular work practices 
over others (Avdagic 2005; Mailand/Due 2004; Meardi 2006). Therefore, the CEE en-
vironment is relatively conducive to a variety of organizational practices without the 
constraining effect of host-country institutions, keeping employment protection and 
formal and informal work standards lower than in continental Western Europe. Had 
Multico been pushed to adapt to local practices because of host-country pressures,12 
empirical findings would indicate more extensive similarities between Multico’s work 
practices and local standards in Hungary and Poland. Instead, evidence suggests that 
some of Multico’s work practices resulting from embedding, and the involvement of lo-
cal actors in the embedding process, exceed Hungarian and Polish standards. Although 
opting for embedding with the involvement of local actors might incur additional costs 
for the firm, the company obtains stability, industrial peace, and a motivated work-
force in exchange. This justifies Multico’s chosen strategy over short-term profitability 
(Thelen/van Wijnbergen 2003). 
Based on the above reasoning, I argue that organizational interests and institutional 
pressures on MNC behavior mutually influence each other in the embedding process. 
In other words, the means of realizing organizational interests, i.e. profits or value-
based interests, such as responsiveness to host-country conditions, are endogenous and 
informed by the MNC’s ability to benefit from host-country resources. At the same 
12 Host-country pressures include, for example, legislation, pressures from trade unions, market 
pressures, or societal pressures to adopt the same work standards as in locally based companies.
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time, postsocialist institutions in Hungary and Poland are important in facilitating 
MNC interests, namely Multico’s attempt at embedding and constructing subsidiary 
work practices with reference to host-country conditions. This argument sees embed-
ding and the related institutionalization of work practices as a contested process in 
which actors’ interests and power resources shape existing institutions instead of merely 
responding to them (Edwards/Colling/Ferner 2007). My argument is thus positioned 
between a narrow rational perspective on MNC behavior and institutional determinism 
with a strong host-country effect (Wailes/Ramia/Lansbury 2003).
Sustainable compatibility between organizational interests and host-country institu-
tions, which is the basis for social interaction between the MNC and local actors in 
the embedding process, requires the MNC and local actors to acknowledge that there 
is a need for compatibility in the first place. For Multico, this means attempting to bal-
ance universal profit interest with institutionally responsive behavior. As already noted, 
Multico is a company that traditionally combines the search for best economic per-
formance with responsiveness to host-country institutions (Bartlett/Ghoshal 2002). In 
consequence, the relative autonomy of Multico’s CEE subsidiary behavior is not the 
result of the firm’s inability to centralize decisions at headquarters and become embed-
ded by controlling host-country resources. Instead, the MNC views the subsidiary as 
the optimal organizational level for making decisions on work practices, thus delegat-
ing decisions on the embedding process and the use of local resources. Therefore, the 
fact that the MNC itself is willing to utilize host-country resources for its embedding 
process and to construct work practices through interaction with local actors eliminates 
the tension between a universal strategy of the MNC and constraints by host-country 
actors and institutions.
Besides MNC interests, the other crucial dimension of functioning compatibility be-
tween organizational interests and local institutions is the local actors’ interests, in par-
ticular their response to MNC behavior in CEE countries. The power asymmetry be-
tween Multico and local actors is obvious from an objective perspective (international 
versus local power resources of Multico and local actors) and from actors’ perceptions. 
Local actors involved in interaction with Multico, most importantly trade unions, sup-
port Multico’s embedding without headquarter involvement and a corporate template 
for firm behavior. Such MNC behavior is more favorable for local actors because it re-
flects individual workers’ needs better than work practices imported from abroad. The 
MNC subsidiaries’ autonomy from corporate headquarters and their openness to social 
interaction with host-country actors give trade unions more opportunities for involve-
ment in the construction of MNC work practices. Even if unions were to opt for similar 
work practices across different countries, due to their competing interests in Western 
and Eastern Europe, company-based trade unions lack the capacity and power vis-à-vis 
the MNC to pursue convergence efforts. 
In sum, compatibility between the MNC’s organizational interests and host-country 
conditions is an important prerequisite for MNC embedding through social interac-
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tion with host-country actors. On the one hand, the MNC’s decentralized organization 
and willingness to benefit from local resources that may differ across host countries is 
a condition for MNC embedding through social interaction. On the other hand, the 
host country’s institutional structure has to be conducive to MNC embedding and offer 
space for actors’ social interaction. Additionally, embedding through interaction forms 
that entail the active involvement of both the MNC and local actors is more likely to 
develop when the interests of host-country actors align with MNC interests. 
5 Embedding as institution building from below
In the introduction, I highlighted two dimensions of embedding: first, how local ac-
tors become capable of shaping MNCs’ organizational practices in CEE subsidiaries 
and, second, how foreign actors, in particular MNCs, become capable of shaping work 
norms. Thus far the paper has focused on the former dimension. This section addresses 
the second dimension, namely, the impact of MNCs on shaping host-country work 
standards that extend beyond the subsidiaries.
Evidence suggests that the form of MNC embedding is not only influenced by, but also 
shapes, the interests of workers and trade unions and the conditions on which cer-
tain work practices are legitimized as local standards (i.e. temporary work and seasonal 
jobs). Next, MNC behavior in CEE host countries contributes to modifying expecta-
tions, benchmarks, and competitive pressures for other employers in the region. MNCs 
thus have great potential to influence local resources and contribute to changes in local 
standards. This is especially the case in host countries that lack extensive formalized re-
sources in the form of detailed labor law or institutionalized collective bargaining. Here, 
MNCs’ social interaction with host-country actors channels the creation of additional 
local resources (e.g., work standards serving as local benchmarks, cooperative industrial 
relations with commitment to informal agreements and moral commitments to worker 
welfare derived from company values). Resources created through informal trust-based 
social interaction may diffuse outside a particular subsidiary and gain acceptance among 
other employers and the local society. This process can be characterized as institution 
building from below, beyond MNC subsidiaries. Thus, in the embedding process, the 
MNC is both an institutional rule taker and a rule maker (Streeck/Thelen 2005). 
Findings in Hungary and Poland give empirical support to institution building from 
below. However, institution building does not lead to coerced conformity of workplace 
institutions with current sectoral or national collective institutions. Instead, the direc-
tion taken is the formation of local standards that are being tailored to the needs of 
individual employers and local labor markets. In the Polish case, this applies to the local 
use of dual work flexibility (a unique combination of temporary contracts and flex-
ible working time; cf. Appendix, Table 1, Note a), extensive fringe benefits, dependence 
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of the local society’s development on MNC involvement, and cooperative industrial 
relations deriving from interpersonal management–union relations. In Hungary, the 
emerging local standards based on Multico’s influence include the development of tem-
porary labor agencies and the use of seasonal temporary workers, company-specific 
ways of addressing workforce shortages, and extensive fringe benefits despite confron-
tational industrial relations. 
Following the above reasoning, I argue that social interaction between MNCs and local 
actors facilitates institution building in postsocialist countries that lack extensive legal 
or collective regulation of work issues. Although the embedding process through which 
MNCs become institutional rule makers differs, I argue that the outcome of MNC em-
bedding in the two host countries studied is the emergence of new local institutions as 
consequence of actors’ behavior and micro-level interaction. 
6 Conclusions
The standard approach in the comparative institutionalist literature on MNCs is to 
focus on the outcomes of MNC embedding in host countries, and thereby inquire to 
what extent MNCs diffuse best organizational practices throughout host countries or 
adapt to host-country standards in work practices (Ferner/Quintanilla/Sánchez-Runde 
2006; Geppert/Mayer 2006). This paper has taken a different approach and attempted 
to combine theoretical and empirical insights into the embedding process of MNCs in 
postsocialist host countries, highlighting the constitutive elements of this process. The 
focus on the embedding process thus addresses a different question, namely the role of 
foreign and local actors in shaping labor market outcomes and institutions in the host 
countries. Drawing on a theoretical perspective that MNC embedding is socially con-
stituted and occurs through the social interaction of MNCs and host-country actors, I 
conclude with two arguments. 
First, MNC embedding is a complex process influenced by a number of organization-
al and host-country factors. In consequence, embedding occurs in distinct ways, with 
greater or lesser involvement on the part of host-country actors. Depending on the 
interests and power resources of the actors involved and the enabling institutional host-
country conditions, distinct dynamics of social interaction between the MNC and host-
country actors will emerge. These dynamics account for different boundaries between 
the extent to which MNC embedding occurs via unilateral managerial decisions on 
work practices and the extent to which embedding results in work practices construct-
ed with the involvement of host-country actors. In this respect, interesting differences 
in interaction between managements and local trade unions were found between the 
Hungarian and Polish Multico subsidiaries. In Hungary, interaction is best described as 
competition, entailing a lack of trust and commitment to jointly agreed work practices, 
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leading to embedding with less local actor involvement. In contrast, a cooperative form 
of interaction in Poland accounts for embedding through extensive involvement of lo-
cal actors. Both kinds of embedding process are predicated on the view that the MNC’s 
economic interest is informed by non-economic factors and social relations. However, 
in the latter case, trust and informal relations between actors underline the social nature 
of economic action, namely the MNC’s openness to local actor influence on its embed-
ding process. Therefore, I argue for a social construction of economic behavior in the 
MNC’s embedding process. The conditions influencing and facilitating the embedding 
process entail compatibility between several resources: the MNC’s corporate values and 
profit interest, host-country institutions, interests of local actors, and trust between 
MNCs and locals. Compatibility is acquired through the MNCs’ organizational inter-
ests reflecting the specificities of the CEE countries’ institutional context.
Social interaction allows MNCs to benefit from local institutional resources. There-
fore, MNC behavior is governed by host countries’ institutions. In other words, institu-
tions in CEE countries are an important resource for the embedding process of MNCs. 
However, my second argument is that it is ultimately the actors that make the most of 
institutional spaces and reconstruct labor market standards. Social interaction creates 
space for MNCs to become legitimate actors, or institutional rule makers, contribut-
ing to institution building in host-country labor markets. Social interaction between 
MNCs and local actors thus also facilitates institution building at the micro level. These 
institutions help regulate employment affairs in environments where the broader insti-
tutional underpinning of work practices and the tradition of collective bargaining are 
less extensive than in continental Western Europe.
What are the broader effects of MNC embedding on CEE host countries? For local ac-
tors in Hungary and Poland, the forms of MNC embedding presented here yield both 
positive and negative effects. The power asymmetry between MNCs and local workers 
and trade unions is obvious in social interaction, MNCs being the more powerful actors. 
In consequence, weak postsocialist trade unions are involved in MNC embedding on 
conditions specified by MNCs. This means that workers and unions are left to the favor 
of MNCs, even if a particular firm provides generous fringe benefits and fosters coopera-
tive relations with the local society. At the same time, the MNC behavior documented 
here does have positive spillover effects on local actors and work standards. This is vis-
ible when evaluating recent trends in working conditions and labor market dynamics 
in postsocialist countries. Working conditions in CEE have noticeably improved since 
the settlement of MNCs, job opportunities with fair working conditions have increased, 
and MNCs offer higher pay and benefits than local employers (Bohle/Greskovits 2006). 
Therefore, despite the increasing dependence of workers and local societies on MNCs, 
MNC embedding contributes to the social and economic development of CEE societies.
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Appendix Table 1: Work practices at MHU and MPL
Evidence Evaluation
Hard work practices MHU (Hungary) MPL (Poland)
Wages Decentralized wage 
setting; median plus wages 
10–20 percent above 
sector average
Decentralized wage 
setting; median plus  
wages 10–20 percent 
above sector average
Adaptation to host-
country wage standards 
Numerical flexibility 
(changes in worker 
headcount)
Workforce size fluctuates 
according to production 
seasonality
Workforce size fluctuates 
according to production 
seasonality
Adaptation to industry-
specific conditions in the 
host region
Working time 
organization
Highly flexible, 4 shifts, 
whereas local standard  
is 2–3 shifts
Highly flexible, min-max 
working time systema
Practices unique vis-à-vis 
local standards and also 
vis-à-vis other Multico 
subsidiaries
Employment  
contract flexibility
Temporary agency  
workers
Seasonal workers with 
short-term seasonal 
contracts or 3-year 
contracts 
Locally constructed unique 
practices instead of passive 
adaptation to existing 
standards. Shaping local 
employment standards b
Functional flexibility 
(task allocation, 
rotation, worker 
exchange between 
tasks and firms)
Permanent division 
into work teams; use of 
the corporate butterfly 
concept.c
Unique exchange of 
temporary workers with a 
nearby ice cream factory 
with opposite production 
seasonality d
Free rotation within 
work teams; use of the 
corporate butterfly 
concept
Limited influence of 
formal institutions 
but great influence of 
production technology. 
Some use of corporate 
concepts.
Unique functional 
flexibility at MHU under 
specific local conditions 
Soft work practices
Motivation and 
performance-related 
pay 
Individual and collective 
financial motivation, 
locally constructed 
monthly performance  
pay 
Individual and collective 
financial motivation, 
locally constructed 
monthly performance  
pay 
Some variation in 
workers’ pay based on 
collective and individual 
performance indicators, 
determined locally
Work organization Great degree of 
informality at the 
workplace 
Formal hierarchy but 
informal daily relations 
Adapting to host-country 
conditions encouraged by 
corporate values 
Employee 
participation in 
management 
decisions
Involvement through 
personal contact, surveys, 
meetings
Involvement through 
personal contact, surveys, 
meetings
Some forms of employee 
participation based on 
corporate concepts; others 
fully local 
Fringe benefits Generous benefits above 
host-country standards, 
constructed locally
Generous benefits above 
host-country standards, 
constructed locally
Generous fringe benefits 
without cross-subsidiary 
coordination encouraged 
through corporate 
paternalism 
a MPL developed an innovative dual flexibility scheme: flexibility through temporary employment contracts 
is combined with working time annualization in the form of min-max contracts, whereby workers are 
paid for 50 percent of the 40-hour working week even when they stay at home due to low production. If 
production increases, workers will work as production requires, up to the stipulated 40 hours per week.
b Shaping local employment standards: In Hungary, MNC demand for agency workers prompted the de-
velopment of temporary labor agencies. In Poland, because of the MNC’s refusal to hire agency workers, 
labor agencies had no incentive to grow.
c Butterflies imply a pool of multi-skilled workers.
d This arrangement secures enough workers for both factories in their high season and improves job secu-
rity for the workers concerned.
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